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Introduction 
 
 
Economic Reforms in France 
Bleak Macroeconomic Data Is Shaking Politics in Paris and Cementing France’s 
Traditional Approach towards the Economic and Monetary Union 
Paweł Tokarski 
With the third government since his election in May 2012, President Hollande will soon 
enter the second half of his term of office. He came to power with promises of economic 
recovery. However, the implementation of a coherent economic program quickly became 
an uphill battle. French voters’ persistent dissatisfaction resulted in two sound elector-
al defeats of the »Parti socialiste« and record support for the »Front National«. The diffi-
culties of the second largest Eurozone economy are sooner or later likely to affect the 
Eurozone’s stability. Why is it so hard to reform France? What does President Hollande 
expect from the Eurozone? And is there an acceptable way to assist French reforms? 
 
The French economy has been severely 
hit by financial and economic turmoil. The 
widening of the current account deficit and 
recent deterioration of the net internation-
al investment position indicate a widening 
competitiveness gap between France and 
northern Eurozone countries. The problems 
with the French economy are numerous: an 
excessive and gradually increasing govern-
ment spending level (one of the highest in 
relation to GDP in all OECD countries, and 
the highest in the Eurozone); rigidity of 
wages; high unit labor costs compared with 
other euro area countries; and red tape. 
All of this puts a heavy burden on the pri-
vate sector, making French companies less 
profitable and more vulnerable to foreign 
acquisitions than their foreign competitors. 
In March 2014, in an in-depth review of the 
French economy, as part of the “Macroeco-
nomic Imbalance Procedure”, the European 
Commission stated that France had been 
experiencing macroeconomic imbalances 
which should be properly addressed. 
On June 2, in the framework of the Euro-
pean Semester, the European Commission 
delivered a slightly more optimistic picture 
than in 2013, but pointed out several struc-
tural problems and cast doubt over the 
deficit assumptions made by the govern-
ment for 2014 and 2015. One of the main 
challenges for the current and future French 
governments is the growing level of general 
government gross debt, which reached 
93.5% in relation to GDP in 2013 and is pro-
jected to reach 95.6% in 2015. A level of debt 
higher than 85% of GDP can be a significant 
drag to economic recovery. Although the 
costs of debt servicing decreased last year, 
in 2013 alone the French taxpayer had to 
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 Figure 1 
Net International Investment Position of France as % of GDP 
Source: Eurostat 
cover €47.3 billion in interest, as 2.3% of 
the country’s GDP (according to Eurostat). 
Sluggish growth and uncertainty in the 
private sector have had consequences for 
the job market. The unemployment rate, 
although considerably lower than in Italy 
or Spain, remains relatively high, especially 
among youth (22.4% in June 2014). This is 
becoming a major predicament for the gov-
ernment and a personal one for President 
Hollande. During one of his first speeches 
after the elections he portrayed himself as 
the “president of the youth” and raised ex-
pectations among his youngest supporters 
by promising change in the job market 
situation. 
The slow, ongoing recovery throughout 
the Eurozone is only modestly apparent in 
the general condition of the French econo-
my. The most recent economic data an- 
nounced in August 2014 were a serious 
Figure 2 
French GDP Volume – Percentage Change over Previous Quarter 
Source: Eurostat. 
blow to the government’s promises, indi-
cating a 0% rate of economic growth in 
the first two quarters of 2014. Excluding 
government expenses, these data show a 
contraction of the private sector, rendering 
the previous government’s end-of-year 
growth forecast of 1% impossible. 
Euro area economies are affected not 
only by the performance of other member 
countries but also by the general political 
situation. Although the so-called “phase 
three” economic sanctions on Russia will 
probably entail fewer costs for France than 
for other big economies of the Eurozone, 
the close economic relations between Paris 
and Moscow (especially in the financial and 
energy sectors) could be a source of risk if 
the political situation in eastern Ukraine 
deteriorates further. 
All of these are worrying signs. The 
French economy – the second largest in the 
Eurozone – has close trade and financial 
ties with other Eurozone members. This 
raises concerns over the possible impact of 
economic problems in France on Eurozone 
stability, and over realistic options for the 
current or next government majority to 
address these issues. 
Limited scope of reforms 
President Hollande won the presidential 
elections in May 2012, when the Eurozone 
crisis was still in full swing. He promised to 
change economic policy by reinforcing pro-
growth policies, and to improve the situa-
tion of the French labor market. 
These reform attempts were immediately 
hampered by a noisy battle over the 75% in-
come tax rate for France’s richest citizens, 
promised in the electoral campaign. The 
“tax on the rich” debate also failed to secure 
popular support for the government, which 
started rapidly decreasing as the general 
public demanded concrete steps to improve 
the economy. 
Broader reform proposals have been 
presented on several occasions as “pacts”, 
but these have not gone far enough to de-
liver a coherent, systemic solution to the 
 -30 
-20 
-10 
0 
10 19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
12
 
20
11
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
 
-0,6 
-0,4 
-0,2 
-1E-15 
0,2 
0,4 
0,6 
0,8 
20
12
Q
1 
20
12
Q
2 
20
12
Q
3 
20
12
Q
4 
20
13
Q
1 
20
13
Q
2 
20
13
Q
3 
20
13
Q
4 
20
14
Q
1 
20
14
Q
2 
SWP Comments 39 
September 2014 
2 
 Figure 3 
Confidence in President François Hollande, May 2012 – September 2014 
Source: http://www.sondages-en france.fr/sondages/Popularite/Fran%C3%A7ois%20Hollande 
 
country’s structural problems. First, the 
“Pact for the Competitiveness of French 
Industry”, prepared by a working group led 
by Louis Gallois and published in November 
2012, focused on French industry as the 
main factor of economic growth, and deliv-
ered a list of 22 rather diverse proposals to 
boost competitiveness and exports. Although 
President Hollande had distanced himself 
from the report even before its publication, 
some of these same ideas were included in 
the “National Pact for Growth, Competitive-
ness and Employment”, announced a day 
later on November 6, 2012 by then Prime 
Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault. The pact’s main 
goal was to reduce social charges for the 
business sector, facilitating access to capital 
for small and medium-sized enterprises and 
simplifying regulations for the business 
sector. 
The most recent (and still ongoing) 
reform measures were unveiled as part of 
the “Responsibility Pact”, personally an-
nounced on January 14, 2014 by President 
Hollande. This pact aims to increase em-
ployment in the business sector by reduc-
ing labor costs, company taxes and red 
tape. The pact was supplemented in April 
by a social pillar aimed at reducing the tax 
burden for the poorest households. The 
flagship project which both pacts are related 
to is the CICE, le crédit d’impôt pour la com-
pétitivité et l’emploi (competitiveness and 
employment tax credit), the aim of which 
is to reduce social charges for companies 
by €20 billion within three years. 
The appointment of Manuel Valls as 
Prime Minister in March 2014, after the 
shocking defeat of the Parti socialiste (PS) 
in regional elections, was intended to add 
fuel to the reform program. He announced 
further cuts of labor costs for the lowest-
income employees and a reduction of the 
income tax surcharge for the largest com-
panies. He achieved some initial successes 
when the National Assembly voted for €50 
billion in budgetary cuts and simplified the 
country’s complex administrative structure 
by decreasing the number of regions. 
However, the rather limited scope of 
the proposed measures and their slow 
implementation are unlikely to produce 
any major effect on the French economy, 
especially on the labor market, before the 
elections in 2017. More than half of the 
proposed spending cuts still need to be 
specified, which could trigger an angry 
reaction from trade unions. Therefore, the 
execution of the adopted fiscal consolida-
tion program remains highly uncertain. 
Moreover, the outcome of the CICE flagship 
project, introduced at the beginning of 
2013, is also questionable. Limiting tax 
reimbursement to employees earning up to 
250% of the minimum legal wage has prob-
ably not benefited companies exporting for 
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 international markets, as much as it has 
benefited large domestic firms employing 
low-qualified workers, such as large retail 
groups. Due to the long duration of the 
legislative process, several measures an-
nounced in the “Responsibility Pact”, such 
as corporate tax cuts, are unlikely to be 
introduced before the end of the current 
political term. 
In addition, in August 2014 the consti-
tutional court questioned the €2.5 billion 
reduction of social charges for the 7.4 mil-
lion lowest-income employees, which was 
supposed to enter into force at the begin-
ning of 2015 to further reduce labor costs. 
As a result, in September the government 
will be forced to propose compensatory 
measures or agree to forego some of the 
pact’s measures. 
The general public in France has re-
mained broadly skeptical towards the 
scope of the reform agenda and its pace of 
implementation. Statements by President 
Hollande have increasingly contradicted 
macroeconomic data. In September, 77% 
of the French public expressed their dis-
satisfaction with the measures taken by 
François Hollande. The private sector 
expressed its discontent as well. At the end 
of June, eight major employer organiza-
tions published a letter to the president 
and the prime minister in the Journal de 
Dimanche, calling for urgent implementa-
tion of the core measures of the Responsi-
bility Pact (i.e. bringing down labor costs 
and the fiscal burden for the private sector, 
reducing red tape, and cutting public 
expenses). 
The recent poor macroeconomic data for 
the first two quarters of 2014 sparked an-
other wave of criticism of the president 
and the prime minister. This constituted a 
serious blow to the government majority 
just before the mid-term elections to the 
Senate in September. The opinion polls from 
September show that over 80% of voters dis-
trust the government’s economic policy. 
Why is reforming France an 
uphill battle? 
History shows that skepticism regarding 
reform options in France is nothing new. 
Past attempts to unblock the French econo-
my abound – some of them dating back to 
the early 1960s, like the report by the Rueff-
Armand Committee which proposed re-
inforcing competition and limiting the 
number of restricted professions. There are 
also many other layers of resistance which 
explain the difficulties of reform processes. 
Trade unions have traditionally played 
an important role in French politics, even if 
the rate of membership among employees 
in France (7.9%) is considerably lower than 
in Germany (18.6%) or in the UK (26.4%). 
Most trade union leaders have a rigid view 
of redistributive economic policy. They are 
politicized and ready for noisy confronta-
tion, even with the socialist government if 
they think their interests are threatened. 
The culture of dialogue is clearly lacking 
compared to Germany, Denmark or Sweden. 
The most recent example of this could be 
seen on July 7 at the annual social confer-
ence. Three large trade union organiza-
tions, namely the FSU (Fédération syndicale 
unitaire), CGT (Confédération générale du tra-
vail) and FO (Force ouvrière), walked away 
from the negotiation table refusing to sup-
port the Responsibility Pact. They argued 
that budgetary cuts would have an adverse 
effect on the country’s economic growth. 
It seems therefore, that any ambitious struc-
tural changes in the economy will auto-
matically incite conflict with the main em-
ployees’ organizations. 
The main problem, however, lies in the 
French political class, both left and right. 
The majority of public opinion still seems 
to be locked into the view of an omnipotent 
role of the state. Thus, while there have been 
numerous proposals to boost economic 
growth through public investments, the 
need for a major revision of the role and 
size of the government sector seems to be 
the primary challenge. This narrows the 
options in designing economic policy. For 
example, instead of adopting systemic 
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 measures, such as permanent reduction 
and simplification of taxes, temporary 
measures such as the CICE are put in place, 
adding complexity to the regulatory frame-
work. The French labor code, at almost 
3,500 pages long and consisting of 10,000 
articles, remains a telling symbol of the 
complexity of French legislation. Another 
example is the housing market. France 
ranks 149th out of 189 economies in regis-
tering property, which does not help to 
decrease the rigidity of the overvalued 
housing market. Against this background, 
EU fiscal rules or the European Central 
Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy are often 
presented in domestic discussions as a 
major obstacle to growth. The benefits of 
European integration, especially in relation 
to the EU single market, are rarely men-
tioned in public debates. This creates very 
fertile ground for Euroskeptic arguments 
that Brussels or Frankfurt-driven economic 
policies are hampering French economic 
growth. 
Cracks inside the ruling party do not 
facilitate the reform task either. The coun-
try’s poor macroeconomic performance will 
boost Hollande’s opponents within the Parti 
socialiste. This opposition group emerged 
inside the PS over the vote on the €50 bil-
lion program of cuts for 2014–2017. Further 
tensions within the PS seem inevitable, 
increasing the risk for the government of 
losing its majority in the National Assem-
bly. In addition, the upcoming presidential 
elections are likely to cause tensions 
between François Hollande, Manuel Valls 
and Arnaud Montebourg (the latter of 
whom is the former Minister of the Econo-
my, who came third in the PS primary 
presidential elections in 2011 and repre-
sents the left-wing of the PS). All are con-
sidered potential presidential candidates of 
the left, and are therefore seeking support 
among the party members. Montebourg’s 
open criticism forced Hollande to reshuffle 
the government for a second time, in a des-
perate attempt to regain political initiative. 
The opposition is calling for the dissolution 
of the National Assembly. However, this is 
unlikely to happen any time soon, as low 
support for President Hollande would force 
him to face cohabitation. The unpopularity 
of Hollande and growing opposition inside 
the PS will reduce the effectiveness of the 
French executive, with possible further 
government reshuffles in the future. An 
ambitious Manuel Valls might decide not to 
risk his future political career by working 
for a president with a record low approval 
rating. It would seem, then, that increas-
ingly unstable domestic politics in France 
offer little room for any major reforms 
before the next presidential and parliamen-
tary elections. 
The main problem with traditional 
French political forces is their low cred-
ibility. In his electoral campaign in 2012 
Hollande raised high hopes among the 
French, to a level that his political force was 
unable to deliver on. He then used up the 
remainder of his support by announcing 
recovery in 2013 and 2014, only to be con-
fronted by economic indicators showing 
the opposite. Yet a change of the ruling 
majority would not offer any viable alter-
native. 
The position of the Union pour un mouve-
ment populaire (UMP) is even worse. The 
socialists’ archrival has found itself in a 
profound crisis, trapped by political scan-
dals and financial problems, barely escap-
ing bankruptcy. The weeks before the next 
UMP congress at the end of November will 
be marked by an internal power struggle. 
Aside from vocally criticizing the PS, none 
of the potential UMP candidates have 
proposed any comprehensive economic 
program. 
The weak macroeconomic data are used 
extensively by the Front National (FN), which 
positions itself as an alternative to tradi-
tional parties. Marine Le Pen censures both 
the PS and the UMP, calling them “UMPS” 
and claiming that they have failed to ad-
dress the country’s economic problems. The 
FN itself offers a mixture of statist and anti-
EU discourse, blaming the “Eurozone eco-
nomic policy” and the euro currency for the 
stagnation of the French economy and its 
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 continued deindustrialization. Their plans 
to introduce economic protectionism, 
increase state ownership, and return to a 
national currency would be disastrous from 
an economic and political perspective both 
for France and the rest of the EU. However, 
this program, being coherent and simple, 
has found numerous supporters (including 
among younger voters), and strong support 
for the FN creates a risk that some elements 
of its economic program may be assimilat-
ed into those of other parties. Recent polls 
indicate that a second round of presidential 
voting in 2017 would be a duel between 
Marine Le Pen and the UMP candidate. If 
Nicolas Sarkozy declared his participation, 
Le Pen would win the first round with 27% 
of votes to 26% for Sarkozy. However, Marine 
Le Pen is viewed very negatively by French 
society at large, which for now makes her 
unlikely to win the second round. Both 
Hollande and Valls are predicted to receive 
17% of votes each. Liberal (centrist) can-
didate, François Bayrou, who seems to offer 
the most credible answers to the country’s 
economic problems, is unlikely to play a 
major role during the presidential and par-
liamentary elections. 
France and the EMU:  
old wine in a new bottle? 
Lack of success in economic policy on the 
national level forces Paris to step up its usual 
pressure on Berlin and Brussels. Already 
during his electoral campaign Hollande 
questioned the policy of austerity and 
promised to renegotiate the “Fiscal Com-
pact” adopted in March 2012. However, he 
had to content himself with the “Compact 
for Growth and Jobs”, which was put to-
gether in two weeks, mostly relying on 
renaming existing EU measures, and which 
failed to have any measurable impact on 
the economy. 
During Hollande’s term of office France 
has failed to deliver any new narrative re-
garding the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), sticking to its traditional, ambigu-
ous approach. It supported the idea of “eco-
nomic government” of the Eurozone, but 
on the other hand it has shown reserva-
tions towards common fiscal rules. France 
has continued its pressure on the ECB to 
take measures such as asset purchases, has 
warned of inflationary risks, and has de-
manded that Germany increase its public 
spending. In June, Hollande presented to 
the European Council his “Agenda for 
Growth and Change in Europe”, which was 
an attempt to influence the new EU politi-
cal cycle. The measures proposed, which 
focused on strengthening redistribution 
mechanisms at the EU level, were similar to 
those of the Compact for Growth and Jobs 
and earlier socialist concepts of the late 
1990s. Hollande called for the creation a 
€1.2 billion program of public investment 
in the Eurozone, combining public and 
private sources with the Eurozone budget. 
France also insisted on increasing the budg-
et for the “Youth Guarantee” to mitigate 
youth unemployment. According to Paris, 
the reinforced coordination of economic 
policies should focus first on social and fis-
cal convergence. French calls for the crea-
tion of “common social rights”, or the 
creation of a minimum wage in the EU, are 
not new and are unlikely to raise enthusi-
asm in other EU capitals. As such, these 
should be interpreted as being aimed at 
domestic supporters of the PS, rather than 
a viable project aimed at increasing Euro-
zone stability. 
The introduction of the new EU political 
agenda in autumn 2014 is likely to be domi-
nated by further tensions concerning fiscal 
policy. In early September, French Finance 
Minister Michel Sapin, confronted by weak 
macroeconomic data showing the contrac-
tion of the economy in the second quarter 
of 2014, confirmed that France would not 
meet the already extended deadline of 2015 
to correct the deficit. Poor GDP growth 
data, high levels of unemployment, lack of 
time, and domestic obstacles to structural 
reforms are likely to increase pressure from 
France and Italy on Germany to make the 
interpretation of deficit rules more flexible. 
France and Italy used enigmatic wording to 
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 interpret the European Council’s June 26–
27 conclusions, announcing that the deficit 
rules would be treated more flexibly. To 
increase leverage on Brussels, Hollande 
mobilized socialist leaders from Europe, 
who met twice this summer in Paris before 
the European Council meetings; however 
the political significance of this group has 
proved limited.  
Their primary demand is to exclude “pro-
growth” investments from the deficit cal-
culation. Accepting this practice would be 
problematical, not only due to unpredict-
able market reactions, but also due to the 
lack of a precise definition of “pro-growth” 
investments. In any case, a softening of the 
deficit rules would not address the main 
problem of France and southern Eurozone 
states, namely their inefficient, overgrown 
public sectors. On the contrary, it would 
discourage policy makers from applying 
painful cuts to the government sector, 
which are so crucial in France’s case. Fur-
thermore, a softening of fiscal rules could 
be difficult to accept, not only in Berlin but 
also in countries like Poland, which has al-
ready sacrificed its private pension scheme 
to comply with deficit rules. 
Recently, PS spokesman Olivier Faure 
demanded that French military spending, 
due to involvement in operations abroad, 
should be taken into account in the deficit 
calculation. This demand was already put 
forward by the Raffarin government in 2004. 
Attempts to soften EU fiscal rules are 
nothing new, as all French governments 
have contested them since the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) was signed. The breach 
of the SGP general government deficit 
threshold in 2003 by Portugal, Germany 
and France led to a significant watering 
down of the rules in 2005. However, unlike 
Germany, France did not use that oppor-
tunity to reform its labor market. This time 
France cannot count on German support. 
A clash over SGP fiscal rules is likely to 
dominate the first half of the EU’s current 
political cycle. Nevertheless, EU leaders 
should be careful not to fuel this conflict, 
which could serve as a useful game for 
domestic purposes in Paris and Rome, 
undermining the Eurozone’s credibility. 
Low yields of government bonds do not 
necessarily signal an increase of confidence 
in the Eurozone, but rather investors’ mis-
trust of economic growth perspectives. The 
market’s patience will soon be tested in 
November, when the ECB announces bank 
balance sheets results, so it is important 
not to send too many negative signals to 
financial markets. 
French economic problems have had two 
major consequences for Germany and the 
process of Eurozone reconstruction. First is 
the lack of a partner, which Berlin requires 
on the road to further Eurozone reforms. 
Since France and its economy are part of a 
problem to deal with, it is unlikely to be 
part of a constructive solution. Secondly, 
France’s poor economic prospects and mis-
trust by its citizens of the ruling majority 
have had a considerable impact. According 
to the European Commission’s ‘blueprint’ 
from November 2012, sooner or later treaty 
changes will be necessary to allow stricter 
budgetary and economic surveillance, and 
reinforced coordination of tax and labor 
policies. A lack of domestic support for 
President Hollande puts at risk any possible 
revisions of the EU’s treaties aiming for 
deeper integration, simplification, or in-
creased efficiency of EMU architecture, as a 
referendum in France would likely produce 
a ‘no’ vote. Any such revisions should be 
reconsidered.  
Limited options for Brussels 
and Berlin 
It seems that the sustainability of the Euro-
zone will largely depend on the ability of its 
largest economies, including France and 
Italy, to successfully apply major structural 
changes. The French economy is of systemic 
importance for the process of Eurozone 
stabilization. EU leaders cannot ignore the 
economic situation in France and simply 
wait for the improvement of economic con-
ditions or a change of the ruling majority. 
However, there is no single, easy way of 
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 dealing with French problems at the Euro-
pean level, as most of the economic policy 
instruments are in the hands of domestic 
decision-makers. 
There is a need for continuous pressure 
at the governmental level from Berlin and 
other European capitals, making it clear 
that a further extension of the deficit dead-
line should only be possible on condition 
that promised reforms go ahead. Otherwise, 
the willingness of other Eurozone countries 
to stick to deficit targets may fade, with all 
the consequences that would entail. How-
ever, German politicians should avoid open 
criticism of France, which could render the 
language of the French left even more con-
frontational. 
The French government, with its very 
low level of support among the public, has 
nothing to lose. Economic reforms could 
still be successful if focused on small steps, 
such as reducing red tape or taming budg-
etary spending. Paris and Rome in particu-
lar seem unwilling to go along with the 
latest proposals from Brussels on their eco-
nomic policies, which puts a question mark 
over the feasibility of planned reforms con-
tracts to be managed by the European Com-
mission. Thus, other incentives for reforms 
at the national level could be helpful. One 
of the latest polls indicates that 70% of 
French voters consider the fight against 
unemployment to be the most important 
goal in the government’s economic policy. 
Therefore, an extension of existing EU 
mechanisms in employment policy should 
be considered. This could be applied to 
youth unemployment, especially among 
low-skilled workers and recent graduates. 
The budget for the Youth Guarantee scheme 
should be increased, as demanded by 
François Hollande at the European Council 
in June. This instrument could also play a 
broader role as an EU tool for supporting 
continuous professional education and 
requalification in Eurozone countries with 
high youth unemployment, particularly 
among low-skilled workers, whose votes are 
increasingly sought after by populist forces, 
including the FN in France. This measure 
could be faster to implement and more 
effective than the EU investment plan of 
€300 billion currently being considered, 
which would probably be largely based on 
renaming existing EU expenses. 
EU leaders often overlook strong poten-
tial for reform in the incomplete single 
market. Paradoxically, the EU is the only 
entity which can be successful in forcing 
the southern economies to introduce some 
market-oriented reforms through the ‘back 
door’. In the past, despite strong domestic 
resistance, several sectors in France (includ-
ing transport, energy and telecommunica-
tions) have been gradually opened up for 
competition in the framework of single 
market liberalization. This has benefited 
the economy and customers. Recent struc-
tural changes to the state railway system in 
France, to comply with single market rules, 
have shown that this can be less politically 
costly than a home-grown reform process. 
Therefore – in addition to the “Digital 
Agenda for Europe” – a new, broader single 
market liberalization package in the service 
sector should be considered in the current 
EU institutional cycle. The main task, how-
ever, is to convince the French left (which 
considers fiscal and social harmonization 
to be the primary objective) that the elimi-
nation of more barriers, for example in the 
EU labor market, would be beneficial for 
the unemployed. 
Even if all of the above measures were 
introduced, they would only support the 
action plan in Paris and not replace it. 
France’s primary problem – its overgrown 
general government sector – urgently re-
quires systemic solutions on the national 
level and decisive leadership in the Élysée 
Palace. 
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